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Abstract 
Fonville, Jonathan Brent. MS. The University of Memphis. May 2011. Illusory Feeling of 
Knowing in Self-Action Perception. Major Professor: Rick Dale, PhD. 
 
The perceptual illusion known as “The Illusion of Authorship” has received much 
attention in recent years. It reflects a false belief that one has willed or authored an event 
to occur, when in actuality it was simply coincidence or chance. Previous research has 
focused on motor movements and the participant’s perception of their movement. 
Researchers have failed to expand on this illusion and apply it to other cognitive 
processes, such as knowledge, metacognition, memory, etc. Two experiments were 
conducted using an action dynamics approach, by collecting arm movement trajectories 
with the Nintendo Wii remote. It was predicted that (1) arm movements will serve as 
signatures for metacognition (Experiment 1) and (2) that perception of arm movements 
should influence that metacognition (Experiment 2). A relationship was discovered 
between arm movements and metacognition. In the second experiment, the effect of self-
action perception had no significant effect on feeling of knowing.  
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We gaze in amazement as a magician pulls a rabbit out of a hat, which was empty 
only a moment ago. Or as he levitates his assistant, we are compelled by what seems an 
impossible feat. We all know that magic is just an illusion, yet we still are dumbfounded 
by the magician’s execution. A wooden dummy begins to take on its own life and 
personality as a ventriloquist manipulates the way we perceive the actions of a piece of 
carved wood. These are prime examples of the gullibility of our perceptual and cognitive 
systems. Along with believing that others are doing incredible feats, we also sometimes 
believe we have caused an incredible occurrence. We can easily trick our cognitive 
system into thinking we have done things in which we had no part. Imagine that you are 
sitting under a tree and you look up at a particular branch. You began to imagine that tree 
limb moving and then suddenly it moves. You look away and try your “mental 
experiment” again, achieving the same results. Suddenly, you begin to experience a 
feeling of authorship, as if you have performed a real-life Jedi mind trick and have caused 
the branch to move. This type of thinking has been referred to as “magical thinking” 
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1983; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000; Pronin, Wegner, McCarthy, & 
Rodriguez, 2006; Woolley, 1997; Zusne & Jones, 1989). 
Throughout any day we may find ourselves imagining a variety of events, and 
finding validation as we watch the event unfold, all the while taking full credit for the 
occurrence. My goal for this research is to show that the perception of one’s own 
knowledge can be “tricked.” I do this by exposing participants to feedback, in the form of 
arm trajectories, on their performance in a general knowledge “test.” Metacognition and 
feeling of knowing (FOK) judgments are incorporated in the form of retrospective 
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confidence ratings regarding their answers to trivia questions. By warping the feedback 
of the arm trajectories, it may be possible to instill a false sense of knowledge and 
authorship, essentially leading participants to believing they have acted in a particular 
way and know a particular piece of information. Such a finding suggests that our very 
sense of self-knowledge is subject to how we perceive ourselves moving in the world. 
When that movement is warped or changed in some way, our cognitive system may 
induce illusory interpretations of the dynamic, constructed “self.”  
Perceptual Adaptability 
Potential illusions do not reveal that the human perceptual and cognitive systems 
are overwhelmingly inadequate, but instead reveal the dynamic adaptability of these 
systems. Research on perceptual-motor alignment has found that our cognitive systems 
can quickly adapt to distortions in perception. An example of this comes from prism 
adaptation studies that have been used to study the adaptability of the perceptual system 
with visual distortions and hand-eye coordination. Participants are either given prism 
glasses, or are asked to sit behind a prism and look through it. These prisms are used to 
either invert the vision, the world appearing upside down, or to skew the visual system on 
an angle, moving things to the left or right by 10 or more degrees. The researchers then 
have the participants do specific arm movements, involving extending their arms, 
touching their noses, and grasping nearby objects. Subjects are quick to adjust their 
movements to successfully perform these tasks with their “new” visual input. A striking 
finding from these studies is that not only do subjects easily adapt to their visual input, 
but also do not lose a sense of self during the visual distortion. They still see the arm as 
their own and the sense of ownership for the arm is not lost (Redding & Wallace, 1992).   
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One of the reasons the human cognitive system is so adaptable is because it can 
readily recognize one’s own movements amongst the movements of others. In a task that 
required participants to make drawings and then recognize their own movements 
retrospectively, participants were able to easily distinguish their own movements against 
simulated movements that they believed to be the movements of others. This ability to 
distinguish and perceive one’s own movements and body is one that develops as early as 
5 months of age (Bahrick & Watson, 1985). An ability to recognize one’s movements is 
important because it is an essential part in the sense of agency and its role in the self-
attribution of actions. The self-attribution of action is permitted due to a strong 
correlation between the expected results of our actions and those resulting outcomes (van 
den Bos & Jeannerod, 2002). Yet there is an important aspect, that when removed can 
make recognition of movements more difficult: velocity. The velocity of movements 
seemed to be the basis for this recognition. When drawing, artists sketch different parts of 
the picture at different speeds. The arm does not move in a constant motion at a constant 
speed, but instead varies in velocity. When the velocity was slowed to a consistent pace 
rather than the original variations of speeds that one would notice when drawing, the 
ability to distinguish self-made movements diminished (Knoblich & Prinz, 2001; 
Knoblich, Seigerschmidt, Flach, & Prinz, 2002).  
It would appear that our cognitive systems are strong-guarded against perception 
failures, with its pre-installed adaptive features; however, failures can occur. While our 
cognitive systems can easily and quickly adapt to changes, false feelings of ownership, 
will and authorship can sometimes occur. We often believe that experiences and 
situations occur solely as a result of our actions. We may falsely assume that the lights 
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come on because “I flipped the switch,” yet a number of other possibilities could have 
occurred, causing the lights to illuminate (e.g., a short in the wiring). On a daily basis, we 
consistently credit ourselves to a number of environmental events as the cause for those 
particular outcomes. These misattributions of cause and will create an illusion just as the 
magician has done with his tricks: an illusion of authorship. 
Three Principles for Illusions of Authorship 
 Prior research has found that three particular ingredients are included when an 
illusion of authorship is experienced: priority, consistency, and exclusivity (Alloy & 
Tabachnik, 1984; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1986; Michotte, 1946/1963; Wegner & Wheatley, 
1999). Priority is indicative of the timing and contemplation of the event. The action or 
event must be preceded by the thought in a proper interval. In experiments of perception, 
people perceive a causal event when one object hits another, causing the second object to 
move (such as in billiards). However, if the objects collide and the second object makes 
no movement or moves before the first even touches it then the causal event has 
diminished and the cause of the event is no longer attributed to the first object (Michotte, 
1963). Thoughts occurring more than a few seconds before an action will lose causality 
because the thought and action are not together in the mind. There is only a small 
window of time prior to an action for relevant thoughts to be viewed as willed and/or 
authored (Heider, 1958; Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).  
 The second principle is consistency, which refers to the compatibility of the 
thought with the action. When people think of an action and then perform that action, the 
experience of will is enhanced. When people have a high frequency of predicting a 
chance event, they are likely to perceive a feeling of control over that event (Langer & 
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Roth, 1975). Likewise, inconsistency of thought and action can cause perceptions of 
involuntariness. When dowsing with a Y-shaped rod people generally report that the stick 
moves on its own with no help from the stick holder. Vogt and Hyman (1959) found that 
when using these rods, people typically make movements in their wrists, which puts 
pressure on the rod and causes it to move “on its own.” The movements caused by this 
pressure are unpredictable and the relationship between the rod’s movements and the rod 
holder’s wrists is readily forgettable, causing a sense of involuntariness in the rod itself. 
This inconsistency of movements causes a loss in the experience of will.  
 The third principle in the experience of will is exclusivity, which refers to the 
potential causes of an action. We must have no reason to believe that the action has 
occurred by any means other than our actions, or that our actions are more salient and 
have more impact on the event than other causes. If the other possible causes are less 
salient, then the experience of will is greater. On the other hand, if other possible 
variables could be causing the action, then the sense of will and authorship diminishes. In 
billiards, the player feels a sense of will when hitting the pool balls either with the pool 
cue or with other balls. Someone bumping into the table at the moment the player hits a 
ball may cause a decrease the sense of will because of the saliency of the bumping. Both 
internal causes (such as thoughts and beliefs) and external causes (e.g., other people) can 
decrease the sense of will (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999).  
 These three principles combine together to form a false sense of will and 
authorship in random events. However, it is not only events that can be misattributed to 
oneself. People also have a tendency to misattribute thoughts and ideas of others as their 
own. Studies have been implemented in which participants falsely recalled ideas as their 
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own, when they were actually thoughts of their experimental partner (Preston & Wegner, 
2007). It would seem as though that our perception of will and authorship is quite 
susceptible to false attributions. During facilitated communication, false attributions run 
rampant when helpers falsely attribute their own typed messages to the autistic children 
they are helping (Jacobson, 1995). This causes a false sense of accomplishment for both 
the children and the helper, though no progress is being made.  
The Role of Feedback 
An important aspect of this illusion of authorship is the role of feedback from the 
body, such as visual and proprioceptive feedback. When we think of an action and then 
perform it, we usually see it happening. We think about moving our hand to grab a glass 
of water and then our hand moves and we grasp the glass. The visual and proprioceptive 
feedback validates our sense of authorship. The visual feedback seems to be so powerful 
that it can even cause false physiological sensations. Botvinick and Cohen (1998) poked a 
rubber arm that participants believed to be their own. Patients reported feeling sensations 
in their actual arm (which was hidden from their view) and some reported experiencing a 
sense of ownership to the arm. The researchers emphasized that visual and tactile 
feedback is sufficient for self-attribution to occur. In another study subjects were asked to 
move their hand in a particular manner while looking at a screen that would show them 
their hand. However, the experimenter’s hand would be shown randomly instead of the 
subject’s hand. The hand would either mimic the subject’s movements, or make different 
movements. Subjects misattributed the hand as their own 30% of the time when the 
movements were similar to those of their own (Daprati et al., 2002). When participants 
were asked to draw straight lines, while simultaneously viewing their “drawings” on a 
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screen, participants made slight deviations when the screen made it seem as if he/she 
were deviating from the straight line. When asked about the deviations, participants did 
not recognize or remember making the movements to counteract the small deviations 
they saw on the screen, but did remember when the deviations were larger. 
Proprioceptive feedback is important and is perceived, but only when deviations are 15° 
or more does the perceiver notice a change is being made. These findings suggest that 
initial movements and intentions are remembered, but the corrections made along the 
way go unnoticed (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998; Frith, 2005).  
Feedback need not always come in a visual form. Physiological states have been 
used to “trick” patients into falsely believing psychological changes. Valins and Ray 
(1967) had participants with a snake phobia view a snake while listening to a calm 
heartbeat, which they were led to believe was his/her own heart, but actually was not. 
These participants were able to get physically closer to a live snake than the ones in the 
control condition. The participants were misattributing this physiological state (heartbeat) 
to themselves and this impacted the way they interacted with the snake. Similarly, Valins 
(1966) used the heartbeat of subjects to skew the attractiveness that subjects reported of 
various pictures of men and women.   
Even though we do not always consciously will an action, it seems there are times 
when we feel we need to reason that we did consciously will the action, even if the 
reasoning is falsely self-attributed. In studies involving patients with alien hand 
syndrome, it becomes apparent that we do not always consciously will the actions of our 
bodies. Gazzaniga (1995) found that split-brain patients would create “left brain 
interpretations” about right hemisphere actions to which the left hemisphere had no 
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awareness of the cause. Other research has argued that actions are not always willed 
because we are not consciously aware of the action until our brains are beginning to make 
electrical signals to make the movements. Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983) found 
that the brain begins to generate signals before patients are aware of their will to make a 
movement. They stated that actions are being unconsciously initiated and therefore 
cannot be “willed.” It is important to note that recent research has found that this 
unconscious willing of action is false and that previous research did not provide evidence 
for unconscious decision (Trevena & Miller, 2010). As a result, the theories of the 
unconscious and conscious initiation of action are still open to debate.  
Though the three principles (priority, consistency, and exclusivity) are generally 
viewed as being the necessary ingredients for illusions of authorship to occur, I 
respectfully disagree that the presence of all three must be present for the illusion to 
occur. Earlier studies found that when priority is no longer factored in (Knoblich & Prinz, 
2001; Knoblich et al., 2002) that participants can still feel authorship retrospectively, 
without priority occurring during the authorship process. This finding leads me to believe 
that presenting visual feedback retrospectively to a participant will present a similar 
finding when velocity variations are removed to keep the movements constant. It should 
become difficult for a participant to distinguish his/her movements between accurate or 
warped depictions of a previous action.  
In sum, I have reviewed the research as it relates to the “illusion of authorship” 
and false attributions of causation and will. Based on this research, I examine to the 
illusion of authorship and its applicability to the ownership of knowledge. Though 
Knoblich and his colleagues (2001/2002) had participants judge their drawings two 
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weeks after the initial actions, I contend that only moments after the action has occurred, 
participants falsely attribute manipulated movements to themselves in the same manner 
as participants whose movements have not been manipulated. The movements made 
between the starting point and their answer will be forgotten, while only their answer and 
intention will be remembered, thus allowing the experimenter to manipulate the 
participant’s sense of confidence and knowledge.  
Metacognition 
Metacognition, specifically metacognitive judgments, has been found to be of 
importance in guiding behavior (Nelson, 1996). By using metacognitive judgments of 
confidence in accuracy, we are able to assume that the judgments form a strong 
relationship with behavior and action. Koriat (1998) found that people blindly follow 
their own metacognitive judgments regardless of their accuracy on the questions. This 
sightless pursuit provides evidence that metacognitive judgments are an excellent 
predictor of one’s behaviors. Based on this, one can be confident that the actions 
performed by participants accurately reflect their metacognitive states and a confidence 
judgment would not even be necessary if a relationship is found between arm movements 
and confidence ratings. The relationship will provide evidence to create a new 
metacognitive measurement using the Wiimote technology that will allow for an explicit 
measurement of the cognitive processes taking place during action and decision-making.  
Experiment 1 
An initial experiment was run to test the materials and to search for any trends 
that may be occurring. Reaction times, confidence ratings, x-flips (e.g., an “S”–shaped 
trajectory would contain 2 or more x-flips), and the ease of the questions were used to 
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test the effectiveness of the chosen methods and materials. It was hypothesized that 
“easier” questions will have faster reaction times, higher confidence ratings, and fewer x-
flips than the “harder” questions.  
Participants. Participants included 10 undergraduate students from the University 
of Memphis who signed up using the psychology subject pool. Each received extra credit 
towards their introductory psychology course and each reported normal or corrected 
vision.  
Interface display and device. The experiment took place in an oblong laboratory 
room (3.8 m x 1.8 m). An Epson LCD projector and Apple Mac mini were placed on a 
small 76 cm high table that stood approximately 2.7 m away from the long wall of the 
room. The Mac mini’s display was projected onto the wall at the end of the room creating 
a display approximately 1.4 m in width (29.1° visual angle). Participants interacted with 
the experimental program by using the Nintendo Wii remote. Standing behind the table, 
participants held the Wii remote in their right hand that was approximately lined up with 
the projector’s lens. The Wii remote interfaces with the Apple mini computer via a 
Bluetooth transfer protocol called DarwiinRemote (2006, Hiroaki Kimura). A Nyko 
infrared emitter at the base of the projected screen provided the remote with a frame of 
reference so that arm movements could be mapped isomorphically onto x,y pixel-
coordinate movements (see Figure 1). MATLAB Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 
1997) was used to develop the experimental program and sample the Wii remote-
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Figure 1. General Knowledge Example Question 
 
 
Stimuli. This experiment used a trivia-style design. General knowledge trivia 
questions normed by Nelson and Narens (1980) were used to elicit arm movement 
trajectories. Ninety questions were chosen from the list of 300. These questions were then 
changed from open-ended questions to multiple-choice questions. Because the original 
norming of these questions may not hold for the present, due to the subject matter, we 
pursued a new norming. To achieve this, the questions were uploaded onto Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk. Twenty-five participants were paid $0.25 to answer the 90 questions 
and rate them on difficulty (easy or hard). After compiling the results, 30 “easy” 
questions and 30 “hard” questions were chosen for these experiments. The questions and 
answer choices were pseudo-randomized to eliminate any potential effects of order or 
pattern in the response options. A confidence scale was also created on MATLAB. 
Participants were then asked to rate their confidence of their performance on a Likert 
scale numbered -7 to +7. 
Measures. The Wii remote is not fixed on a surface, as in computer-mouse 
studies, (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007; Spivey, Grosjean, & Knoblich, 2005), but instead 
allows for free movement of the extended arm in which the remote is being held. This 
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causes constant subtle fluctuations in the extended arm and hand. To account for these 
fluctuations, a small region around the starting point for each question was defined and 
the recording of arm movements began once the cursor left this “escape” region. 
Previously, Dale, Roche, Snyder, and McCall (2008) used a 100-pixel escape region and 
the same region was used for these studies. The movement of each participant’s arm was 
tracked and recorded using the Wiimote. This not only allows for analysis of the actual 
movements, but is also the method by which the feedback can be collected and presented 
to each participant. The reaction time (the time from when the participant leaves the 
“escape region” and when he/she answers the question) was collected for analysis, as 
well as the ratings given by participants on each of question blocks.  
Task. For experiment 1, participants were asked to answer a set of 60 trivia 
questions. The questions were displayed on the screen as described above with the 
question at the bottom of the screen and each answer option in the top two corners (see 
Figure 1). Participants clicked the “Start” button, initiating the first question. After the 
question had been answered the participants were told to click the “Rate” button, 
initiating the Likert screen. The screen displayed the question “How confident do you 
feel about your previous answer?” and below the question a Likert scaled numbered -7 to 
+7 was displayed (see Figure 2). Participants would simply click the number on the 
Likert scale that best reflected his/her level of confidence. After the confidence had been 
rated, a “Next” button was displayed that would initiate the subsequent question. When 
all 60 questions had been answered and the confidence ratings were fulfilled, the 
experiment was complete. Participants were then debriefed and given a copy of the 
informed consent. 
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 A linear mixed-effects regression was run using confidence ratings at the outcome 
variable and question ease as the predictor variable. There was a significant effect of 
question ease (i.e., whether the question was categorized as “easier” or “harder”) on the 
confidence ratings reported by the participants, F(1,598) = 72.44, p < 0.001. The “easy” 
questions had higher confidence ratings (for means see Table 1). 
 A second test was run in order to examine other relationships among the 
variables. A linear mixed-effects regression was run using reaction time (i.e., the total 
time from when the question presented until an answer was chosen) and question ease. 
There was a significant effect with easier questions having shorter reaction times, 
F(1,598) = 15.43, p < 0.001.  
 A final test was run to test any relationship between trajectories (x-flips) and 
question ease. Previous research has found a link between number of x-flips and 
complexity of cognitive process (Dale & Duran, 2010; Dale et al., 2008; Duran, Dale, & 
McNamara, 2010). A linear mixed-effects regression was run using x-flips (i.e., when the 
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direction of the trajectory shifts across the x axis) and question ease. There was a 
significant effect with easier questions having fewer x-flips, F(1,598) = 17.82, p < 0.001. 
Discussion 
 The results from experiment 1 support the methods used. The results are 
indicative of the relationship between metacognitive judgments and action. As predicted, 
the “easy” questions had faster reaction times, higher confidence ratings, and fewer x-
flips. One can be confident that the chosen methods allow the metacognitive states of 
participants to be analyzed without an explicit questioning of such. It also allows for an 
accurate analysis of the cognitive processes taking place during the decision-making and 
actions being made. The patterns found in this experiment serve as an index of 
metacognition by using arm movements. With no trepidation regarding the trajectories’ 
reflections of confidence and self-action, the chosen methods can now be applied to the 
illusion of authorship and knowledge.  
 
Table 1  
Group means for X-Flips, Reaction Time (in seconds) and Confidence Ratings (in pixels) 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
 Easy Hard Easy Hard 
X-Flips 10.05 12.80 13.66 16.32 
Reaction Time 5.05 6.10 5.38 6.30 
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Experiment 2 
 A second experiment was run in order to test the theory of illusions of authorship 
and its application to an illusion of knowledge. The chosen methods were shown to 
successfully reflect participants’ metacognitive states in answering general knowledge 
questions in relation to self-made actions in the form of arm trajectories. It was 
hypothesized that participants will report higher ratings of confidence in conditions in 
which their trajectories have been warped to reflect a higher level of confidence.  
Participants. Participants included 30 undergraduate students from the University 
of Memphis who signed up using the psychology subject pool. Each received extra credit 
towards their psychology course, and each reported normal or corrected vision. 
Interface display and device.  The same display and devices used for experiment 
1 were used for experiment 2.  
Stimuli. The same pseudo-randomly ordered set of 60 questions and Likert scale 
from experiment 1 were used as the stimuli for experiment 2.  
Task. Participants were informed that they would answer five blocks of 12 trivia 
questions with a total of 60 questions altogether. They were then told that after each of 
the 12-question blocks, they would receive feedback on their performance and were 
asked to rate their confidence on each question. Once participants were clear on the 
instructions, the experiment began. Trials began with a display containing the word 
“Start” and the participants pointed and clicked on “Start” using the Wiimote to initiate 
the experiment. Two answer choices (one correct and one incorrect) at the top left and 
right position of the screen appeared and a trivia question appeared at the bottom center 
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of the screen. The participants then moved the Wii remote cursor to the answer they 
wished to choose for the question.  
The questions were split into five blocks containing twelve questions. After 
completing each block, participants were presented with feedback regarding the previous 
12 trials. Participants were presented with each question from the completed block. The 
question was presented on the screen and the participant’s arm trajectory was “drawn” 
onto the screen to show the participant how he or she answered. A Likert scale (identical 
to the one used in the previous experiment, figure 2) was presented and participants 
clicked on the number that best represented their feeling of confidence in his or her 
answer. Once feedback had presented and the Likert scale had been answered for each 
question, the participants began the next block of questions. 
Once all 60 questions were answered, a screen appeared displaying the words 
“Begin Part 2.” New instructions were given to the participants regarding the second part 
of the experiment. Participants were told that they would now see four questions they 
answered correctly along with their trajectory on each question. After reviewing the 
question they were asked to pick which of the four possible answers best explained why 
they chose their answer. The four answer choices were then presented on the screen: 
“Learned in class,” “I guessed,” “Not Sure,” and “ Past Experience.” Participants chose 
an option and the next question was then presented. Once all four questions were 
reviewed and answered, the experiment ended.1 
Manipulation. Two conditions were used in this experiment: “Neutral” and 
“Confident.” Throughout the experiment, one-third of the questions were randomly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 A short pilot study originally had this second part as an oral self-report. The answers 
were counted and these four answers occurred more often than any others. 
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chosen by MATLAB. These randomly chosen questions were part of the experimental 
condition. When the feedback was presented to the participants, the questions from this 
condition were “warped.” The trajectories were morphed by a set of algorithms to reflect 
a “confident” trajectory (straighter, and moving directly to the participant’s chosen 
answer). The mean of the x,y coordinates of the original trajectory was compared with 
the mean of a straight line, with the straight line being weighted more heavily. The 
correctness of the participants’ answers was kept the same, with only the trajectory being 
manipulated. The remaining two-thirds of the questions were part of the “neutral” 
condition. The trajectories for these questions consisted of the participants’ trajectories in 
their natural form, with no warping taking place. These questions served as our control 
trials.2 
Knoblich et al. (2001) found velocity to be of great importance. To ensure that the 
participants were exposed to their own subtle trial-by-trial modulations of velocity, the 
warping was applied to the participants’ actual trajectories, and not simulated trajectories. 
By having the questions randomly chosen and warped, each participant received an equal 
opportunity to be presented with both types of trajectory confidence levels (confident and 
neutral). In order to look at the proportions of false attributions of knowledge, four 
additional questions were presented to participants in a second part of the experiment. 
These questions were randomly chosen from the questions that the participant answered 
correctly in the first part of the experiment. Two of the four questions had been 
previously warped in the confident condition and the other two were chosen from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The original design of this experiment contained three conditions: “neutral,” 
“confident,” and “unconfident.” The unconfident trajectories were to be warped to reflect an 
unconfident style trajectory (containing more x-flips, and a movement towards the opposite 
answer). However, due to a MATLAB programming error, this condition was inactive and never 
warped any of the randomly chosen questions, resulting in 2/3 of the questions being “neutral.” 
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neutral condition. By choosing only correct answers, we can more accurately assess to 
what extent the confident movements influence the participant’s beliefs about what 
he/she “knew.” 
Analysis. In order to statistically analyze the variables and relationships, mixed-
effects models were used. The manipulation and warping of arm trajectories were used as 
predictors in different analyses. The second part of the experiment was analyzed using a 
logistic regression to examine any potential relationship between the condition of the 
warping for each question and the answer chosen by participants (i.e., do the chosen 
answers predict which condition the feedback was from?). 
Results 
In hopes of obtaining similar patterns found in Experiment 1, the same analyses 
were run first using the same variables (number of x-flips, reaction times, and confidence 
ratings) before the new variables (conditions of arm trajectory warping) were analyzed. A 
linear mixed-effects model was used with confidence ratings as the outcome variable and 
question ease as the predictor variable, inputting subject as a random factor. There was a 
significant effect of question ease (i.e., whether the question was categorized as “easy” or 
“hard”) on the confidence ratings reported by the participants, F(1,1798) = 373.68, p < 
0.001.  
Another linear mixed-effects model was run using x-flips (i.e. when the direction 
of the trajectory shifts across the x axis) and question ease. There was a significant effect 
with easier questions having fewer x-flips, F(1,1798) = 30.07, p < 0.001 (for means see 
Table 1).  
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An additional linear mixed-effects model was run using reaction time (i.e., the 
total time from when the question presented until an answer was chosen) and question 
ease. As in Experiment 1, there was a significant effect with easier questions having 
shorter reaction times, F(1,1798) = 26.53, p < 0.001. 
 With confidence that the initial relationships in Experiment 1 were consistent in 
Experiment 2, new analyses can be run to test the effects of Experiment 2’s manipulation. 
A linear mixed-effects model was employed to test the effect of condition (“neutral,” and 
“confident”) on the confidence ratings of participants. There was a nonsignificant effect 
with condition as a predictor variable, ratings as the outcome variable and subject as a 
random factor, F(1, 1798) < 1, p = 0.68 (see Table 2 for means). 
 Though confidence ratings did not differ significantly across the conditions, a 
linear mixed-effects model was used to see if condition caused a great number of x-flips 
during the rating process. With subject as a random factor, rating x-flips was input as the 
outcome variable and condition as the predictor variable. The effect was nonsignificant 
F(1, 1798) = 1.659, p = 0.20 (see Table 2 for means).   
For the second part of the experiment, a logistic regression was run with condition 
as the outcome variable and the four answer choices as the predictor variables to see if a 
particular response predicted which condition the feedback represented. The full model 
containing all predictors was not statistically significant, χ2(3, N = 84) = 0.674, p = 
0.879. The answer chosen by participants had no relationship to the condition of the 
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Table 2.  
Group means for Confidence Ratings (in pixels) and X-Flips during rating. 
 Experiment 2 
 Neutral Confident 
Confidence Ratings 142.71 136.70 




This experiment attempted to examine the ability to use self-action perception in 
the form of visual feedback to influence a sense of confidence in knowledge. In the 
second experiment, the same patterns were found as those in Experiment 1. The “easy” 
questions had fewer x-flips, shorter reaction times and higher confidence ratings. These 
findings replicate those obtained in Experiment 1. An important relationship was 
discovered between arm movements and metacognition. The arm movements accurately 
reflect metacognition in real-time. However, the new variable and manipulation added for 
Experiment 2 yielded no significant results. In the current design, manipulating the self-
action feedback did not affect participants’ sense of confidence in performance and 
knowledge.  
In regards to the second part of the experiment, it was found that the warping had 
no relationship with the answers given by participants. Warping the trajectories did not 
alter the sense of knowledge (the participants’ tendency to answer “learned in class” or 
“past experience” for a feeling of knowledge rather than answering “guessed” or “not 
 
	   21	  
sure” for no feelings of knowledge). As we discuss below, there may be reasons the 
experiment did not display self-action perception effects. 
General Discussion 
The main focus of these experiments was to examine the impact of self-action 
perception on the feeling of knowing and metacognition. Does the illusion of authorship 
hold when a feeling of priority is retroactively induced? This is an important 
psychological phenomenon to examine due to its applicability in education, particularly 
with intelligent tutoring systems. If providing feedback to students can affect their 
confidence and ideally increase their accuracy, then it could be easily incorporated into 
tutoring systems to improve learning.  
By using a dynamic approach, the real-time unfolding of the cognitive system 
cannot only be tracked via the Wiimote, but then can also be used as feedback to give 
participants an accurate account of his/her performance. Feedback in various forms has 
been found to have an impact on perception, fear, metacognition and other psychological 
issues. Feedback from the environment plays a crucial role in the illusion of authorship, 
and it must be included in some way to give participants information regarding the 
actions and decisions they have just made. Manipulating this feedback was hypothesized 
to influence the sense of knowledge and confidence in participants. It was predicted that 
(1) arm movements will serve as signatures for metacognition (Experiment 1) and (2) that 
perception of arm movements should influence that metacognition (Experiment 2). 
In both experiments, a dynamic motor pattern was found that reflected 
metacognitive reports of confidence in performance. Trajectories that were faster and 
contained fewer x-flips were indicative of the participants’ confidence. These trajectories 
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correlated with higher ratings of confidence in both experiments. This finding supports 
the design of the study and the assumption that the pattern of arm trajectories reflects the 
cognitive processes in action. The pattern of an arm trajectory can accurately reflect the 
cognitive state of the individual in real-time and obtaining the individual’s self report 
becomes unnecessary. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration that collateral 
movement variables, like reaching behaviors, can serve as indices of metacognitive 
states. 
Flaws in the experiment’s design and execution can account for the Experiment 
2’s nonsignificant effect. When presenting the trajectories to the participants there was an 
inconsistency with the velocity and shaping. Though none of the participants reported 
“anything strange” about the trajectories in an informal post-experiment interview, the 
“confident” trajectories were easily distinguishable from the “neutral” trajectories and 
could have been indicative that the trajectories were unnatural. Attempting to straighten 
the trajectories for the “confident” condition was difficult due to the variability of 
participants’ movements. Variations in x-coordinates caused a significant slowing of the 
trajectories’ speed. This problem can be fixed for future experiments by altering the 
algorithms used for the warping and reducing the sampling rate of the trajectories. A 
procedure known as “down sampling” will reduce the number of x,y-coordinates to be 
drawn on the screen and will speed up the trajectories, making them comparable to the 
“neutral” trajectories. Down sampling does not alter the configuration of the confident 
trajectories, but instead alters the velocity.  
Another error in this study is the uneven data. Only one-third of the data in 
Experiment 2 came from the experimental condition. Having a greater amount of the 
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control condition (“neutral”) does result in less variance for that condition, but it does not 
maximize the benefit of the within-subjects power that was sought. By increasing the 
number of experimental trials, more data can be included into the analyses and more 
variance can be accounted for, perhaps leading to different outcomes in the results of the 
first part of the experiment. The second part of the experiment was unaffected and 
enough trials remained as they were originally designed; yet still no influence was found.  
Though the purpose was to study the impact on an implicit level, participants 
could have been trained on trajectories. Rather than train participants on these patterns, 
these experiments were designed to examine the implicit nature of feedback without prior 
knowledge of a prototypical “confident” trajectory. If participants had been aware of the 
that arm trajectories were indicative of confidence and cognition, the results of this study 
may have been different, but would have reflected the participants’ perception of the 
feedback as they had been trained. The purpose of our design was to test the potential 
implicit influence of arm movements on metacognition. In an informal post-experiment 
interview, participants were asked if they were aware of what the trajectories indicated. 
Most reported accurately perceiving it as the “way I moved my arm” with only a small 
portion (5 participants) reporting paying no attention to the feedback or having no 
thought of the trajectories. These participants were still included into the analyses 
because of the study’s emphasis on implicit perceptions of the feedback. 
Though Valins (1966) found significant results when using heart rates as 
feedback, heart rate is a more widely known indicator of physiological and psychological 
being. With the increasing popularity of the Nintendo Wii and its use of the motor 
movements and feedback, the population will become more experienced in perceiving 
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self-made actions. With this new awareness of body and motion comes a greater 
awareness of the impact that actions have on the environment. Unfortunately, a lack of 
knowledge regarding significant patterns found in trajectories may also account for the 
nonsignificant effect impact of the feedback. 
For future studies, the MATLAB scripts can be refined to more accurately 
account for variations in arm trajectories to obtain a more normalized and consistent 
manipulation. Standardizing the velocity across conditions is important for minimizing 
any cues that any one trajectory is different from another other than the path taken from 
question to answer. The inclusion of unconfident trajectories is a goal for future studies. 
Perhaps confident trajectories don’t seem to differ from neutral trajectories due to the 
natural variations of arm trajectories, but they may differ from unconfident trajectories in 
which a prototypical pattern differentiates the two conditions. Currently, these 
modifications have been made and a new experiment is underway in hopes of correcting 
for the issues of Experiment 2. Once these adjustments have been made and data are 
collected, then a clearer picture can be painted about the induction of the illusion of 
authorship in a retroactive perceptual fashion. 
It would seem that the illusion of authorship and magical thinking are more 
complex than originally believed. Much of magic and puppetry can be explained by 
perceptual trickery, which when revealed, seems so simple and logical. Yet, we still fall 
victim to this trickery. Though Wegner and Wheatley (1999) argue that an illusion of will 
or authorship can be created by a simple combination of specific elements, this research 
would point to a more intricate pathway from intent to a belief of authorship.   
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